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A COMMENTARY ON THE ECONOMIC

LOSS DOCTRINE UNDER THE RULE OF
CEASE ELECTRIC AND CASCADE STONE
JOHN D. FINERTY, JR.*
CHARLES J. CRUEGER
I. INTRODUcTION

The economic loss doctrine is a judge-made rule that seeks to
preserve the distinction between contract and tort on the basis that
"contract law, and the law of warranty in particular, is better suited than
tort law for dealing with purely economic loss in the commercial
arena."' Wisconsin courts have struggled, however, to fashion uniform
rules to apply this doctrine. The result is a line of inconsistent cases
constructing artificial eligibility requirements that have, ultimately,
abandoned the very principles the economic loss doctrine was created to
safeguard.
An excellent example of the unworkable consequences of this
struggle is Insurance Co. of North America v. Cease Electric, Inc.2 and its
recent progeny Linden v. Cascade Stone Co.' and Grams v. Milk
Products, Inc.' In Cease Electric, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held
that the economic loss doctrine does not apply to contracts for services;
thus, a property owner who hired Cease Electric by virtue of an oral
contract to wire a ventilation system could pursue a tort claim for
negligent performance of services provided under the contract.' The
court's holding diverged from its earlier holdings in cases such as Van
Lare v. Vogt, Inc.,6 which threw out tort claims over representations
* Mr. Finerty (UW-Milw. MA Econ. 1999; Marq. JD 1992; UW-Madison BBA 1988)
and Mr. Crueger (UW-Madison JD 1997; BA 1993) are partners in the Litigation Practice
Group at Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, Milwaukee, WI. The authors wish to thank Justice
William A. Bablitch (Ret.) for helpful comments on early drafts and David F. Loeffler, Esq.
for an insightful critique of the final article.
1. Daanen & Jassen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 842, 845-46 (Wis. 1998).
2. 2004 WI 139, 688 N.W.2d 462.
3. 2005 WI 113, 699 N.W.2d 189.
4. 2005 WI 112, 699 N.W.2d 167.
5. Cease Elec., 2004 WI 139, 2, 688 N.W.2d at 464.
6. 2004 WI 110, 683 N.W.2d 46.
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made in the sale of real property,7 and Mackenzie v. Miller Brewing Co.,8
which applied economic loss doctrine precedent to limit tort claims in
breach of employment contract cases. 9 Further, the court's inconsistent
holdings and its selective reliance on decisions from other states, blur
the distinction between tort and contract law and create marketplace
uncertainty that inhibits the ability of parties to service contracts to set
prices. In essence, by overlaying tort law on service contract cases, as
the court did in Cease Electric, the court injected an element of social
commentary-specifically, that those who purchase services are in an
inferior bargaining position-into the terms of a select category of
private contracts. The court then compounded the problem in Cascade
Stone when it held that whether the economic loss doctrine applies to
contracts for services and products turns on a multi-factor test to
determine if the contract is "predominantly" for services or a product."
We propose a new rule.
When commercial parties freely and voluntarily enter into a
contract, such that the contracting process has integrity and the policy
implications of tort law do not arise, the parties are limited to their
bargain. The issue courts should decide is whether the contracting
process had integrity, not whether the contract called for services,
products, or some combination of the two. Unlike tort law that "is
rooted in the concept of protecting society as a whole from physical
harm to person or property[,]" contract law-without regard to whether
the contract is one for products or services-"rests on obligations
imposed by bargain[,]" and it allows parties to protect themselves
through bargaining." The rule we propose preserves this distinction
between tort and contract law and leaves policy-making, for the most
part, to the parties.
As things stand now, however, the court in Cease Electric and
Cascade Stone has set itself up as the ultimate second-guesser in the
contracting process between private parties; its role is now to label a
contract either for services or products and, in so doing, determine the
remedies available to a buyer for a breach by a seller, but without
regard to the remedies the parties agreed upon in the contract. But
contracting parties want enforcement, not judicial explanations about

7. Id. 42, 683 N.W.2d at 56.
8. 2001 WI 23, 623 N.W.2d 739.
9. Id. 1, 623 N.W.2d at 740.
10. 2005 WI 113, T$ 8-12, 699 N.W.2d at 193-94.
11. Daanen & Jassen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 842,846 (Wis. 1998).
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artificial distinctions and multifactor tests that have no practical use in

the contracting process. 2 As a result, the rules of contract common law
in Wisconsin should change to return control over contractual
relationships to private parties. The court's decision in Cease Electric

demonstrates the need for this reform.
II. THE CEASE ELECTRIC DECISION
An egg farmer, Cold Spring, needed to upgrade the ventilation
system in its barn.13 It purchased a new ventilation system but needed
an electrician to wire the system according to an one-page wiring

schematic provided by the ventilation system's manufacturer. 4
Therefore, Cold Spring entered into an oral contract with Cease Electric
to install the necessary wiring and conduit." Cold Spring became
dissatisfied with Cease Electric's work and terminated the relationship

after Cease Electric finished "because it believed that Cease [Electric]
had not completed the project correctly or in a timely fashion."' 6 The

ventilation system subsequently failed, resulting in the death of nearly
18,000 hens. Cold Spring had insured against this loss, however, and it
recovered its lost income and damages for the death of the hens under
the policy. 7 Its out-of-pocket cost was $39,762, which included the
policy deductible."
Cold Spring hired an electrician to investigate the cause of the
ventilation system failure. 9 The electrician concluded that Cease
Electric had improperly wired the system by wiring the main and backup systems to the same power source.20 Based on this analysis, Cold

12. "Thirsty folk want beer, not explanations." Montgomery v. Thompson, [1891] 8
RPC 361 (L.R.H.L.S.C.).
13. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec., Inc., 2004 WI 139, 1 3, 688 N.W.2d 42, 465.
14. Id. T17, 688 N.W.2d at 465.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Cold Spring's hens were "scheduled property" on its policy that protected against
just such an accident as occurred here by virtue of a "Ventilation Coverage Endorsement."
See Petitioner's Brief at 3, Cease Elec., 2004 WI 139, 688 N.W.2d 462 (Case No. 03-0689);
Petitioner's Reply Brief at 2, 15, Supp. App. at 201-04. See Ins. Co. of N. Amer. v. Cease
Elec., 2004 WI App 15, 8, 674 N.W.2d 886, 889. ("Pursuant to the insurance contract, INA
paid Cold Spring $118,339.20 for the loss of income and $40,704.89 for the loss of chickens.").
This fact was not mentioned by the court.
18. Cease Elec., 2004 WI App 15, 8,674 N.W.2d at 889.
19. Id. J 8, 688 N.W.2d at 465.
20. Id. 1 9, 688 N.W.2d at 465.
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Spring's insurer, the Insurance Company of North America ("INA"),
with Cold Spring as an involuntary plaintiff, sued Cease Electric,
alleging that it was negligent in performing the electrical services." The
parties stipulated to damages of $204,065 (the loss of income plus the
cost of rewiring the system and replacing the hens)." The sole count on
the special verdict form submitted to the jury was for negligence. 2 A
jury found Cease Electric liable. 4 Cease Electric moved for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict to preclude the tort claim, citing the
economic loss doctrine.25 The trial court denied the motion. 26 The court
of appeals rejected Cease Electric's primary appeal argument that the
economic loss doctrine barred Cold Spring's tort claim, and the
Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed.27
The Wisconsin Supreme Court found that the oral contract to install
the ventilation system was for a service, not for a product, because all
Cease Electric had to do was follow the wiring schematic. 2 Based on
that factual finding, the court then held that INA and Cold Spring could
pursue their tort claims because the economic loss doctrine does not
apply to contracts for services.29 It reasoned that the policy behind
applying the economic loss doctrine to contracts for the sale of goods(1) to maintain the distinction between tort and contract law, (2) to
protect the freedom to allocate risk, and (3) to encourage the party best
situated to assess the risk of loss to assume, allocate or insure against
that risk-did not apply to contracts for services.30 The court found tort
21. The complaint alleged three negligence theories: Cease Electric mis-wired the main
and backup systems to the same power source, the components Cease Electric used were
defective, and Cease Electric failed to test the final installed system. Petitioner's Brief at 8,
10, Cease Elec., 2004 WI 139, 688 N.W.2d 462 (No. 03-0689); Transcript of Record at 58-59,
Cease Elec., 2004 WI 139, 688 N.W.2d 462 (No. 03-0689).
22. Cease Elec., 2004 WI 139, 11,688 N.W.2d at 465.
23. Petitioner's Motion to Supplement the Record at 2, Cease Elec., 2004 WI 139, 688
N.W.2d 462 (No. 03-0689); Transcript of Record at 43:1-2, Cease Elec., 2004 WI 139, 688
N.W.2d 462 (No. 03-0689).
24. Cease Elec., 2004 WI 139, 11,688 N.W.2d at 465.
25. Transcript of Record at 293, Cease Elec., 2004 WI 139, 688 N.W.2d 462 (No. 030689).
26. Id.
27. Neither party argued, and the court never addressed, whether the "other property"
exception to the economic loss doctrine allowed Cold Spring's insurer to pursue its tort claim
against Cease Electric for the death of the hens. See, e.g., A.J. Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 634 A.2d 1330 (Md. 1994) (finding the economic loss doctrine inapplicable
because chickens killed by ventilation system malfunction were "other property").
28. Cease Elec., 2004 WI 139, 18, 688 N.W.2d at 466.
29. Id. 53, 688 N.W.2d at 472.
30. Id. 38, 688 N.W.2d at 470.
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law, not contract law, was instead better suited to deal "with purely
economic loss in the context of service agreements."'"
The court offered several reasons for its conclusion that contract law
was ill suited to remedy breaches of service contracts. For starters, the
court wrote that the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."), does not
apply to service contracts.32 According to the court, not only does the
U.C.C. assume a bargain between two parties of relatively equal
bargaining power, but it also provides comprehensive remedies that
ensure contracts for products are uniformly enforced; thus, "the built-in
warranty provisions that the U.C.C. may provide in a contract for the33
sale of products or goods would not apply to a contract for services.
Because the court believed that the U.C.C. does not apply to service
contracts, it "decline[d] to extend the economic loss doctrine in this
case."
The court further concluded that "the fundamental premise" of
contract law-that the parties will allocate the risks and remedies"simply is not at work with many service contracts."35 Thus, "the policy
of maintaining the distinction between tort and contract law does not
warrant the invocation of the economic loss doctrine., 36 The court went
so far as to opine that "information disparities" and unequal bargaining
power between parties to service contracts precluded any presumption
that the party in the best position to assess the risk of economic loss
should be encouraged to assume, allocate, or insure against the risk.37
Finally, the court expressed a fear that applying the economic loss
doctrine to contracts for services could be interpreted to extinguish
professional malpractice claims against attorneys, engineers, architects,
and other professionals.3 8 In doing so, it declined to follow Illinois
common law that applies the doctrine on a case-by-case basis to services
that result in tangible objects, such as an improvement to real property. 9
31. Id. 35, 688 N.W.2d at 469.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. 36, 688 N.W.2d at 469.
35. Id. 9142, 688 N.W.2d at 470. The court provided no citation to authority or
supporting evidence for this assertion.
36. Id. 1 42-43, 688 N.W.2d at 470.
37. Id. 1[ 45-48, 688 N.W.2d at 471. The court again cited no authority or evidence
supporting its conclusions; indeed, it did not mention the undisputed fact that Cold Spring
had insurance protecting it against the very same loss it incurred in the case. That fact, as we
discuss later, undermines the court's social policy argument.
38. Id. $$ 49-50, 688 N.W.2d at 471.
39. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. SEC Donohue, Inc., 679 N.E.2d 1197 (111. 1997).
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The court opted for what it called a "bright-line" rule that would avoid
the problems lower courts would face in applying the doctrine in future
contract cases. 4' As we shall see, the court's underlying assumptions are,
for the most part, untrue.
III.

IMPLICATIONS OF CEASE ELECTRIC AND THE PROBLEMS IT
RAISES

The premise of Cease Electric is that tort law, not contract law, is
better suited to remedy breaches of contracts for services. Cease
Electric's conception of the role of tort law diverges widely from the
conception underlying the court's earlier precedent. The conflict
between these differing conceptions of the role of tort law in general,
and the economic loss doctrine in particular, is troubling for two related,
but different, reasons. First, Cease Electric represents a new line of
reasoning on how and, most importantly when, to overlay tort law on
contract law. The distinction drawn in prior cases between tort and
contract law is important because the two areas of law serve different
purposes. Tort law regulates social conduct; liability in tort arises when
one party breaches a duty imposed as a matter of social policy. 41 In
contrast, contract law protects the bargained-for expectations of parties
to a contract.4 ' A breach of contract claim thus arises when one party
breaches a duty imposed by mutual consent.43 Cease Electric turns
duties that arise under private contracts into societal obligations.
The second reason that the premise of Cease Electric is troubling is
that the court's conflicting conceptions of the economic loss doctrine
will prove problematic for lower courts to apply in future cases. This is
especially in cases that involve written contracts for services and those
that call for a mix of products and services. A better rule-the rule we
propose here-would dictate that parties to a contract that is entered
into freely and with the opportunity to bargain can have their contract,
and only their contract, enforced.

40. Cease Elec., 2004 WI 139, 52, 688 N.W.2d at 472.
41. Economic loss doctrine cases such as Van Lare v. Vogt have made this point: "[T]ort
law focuses on 'protecting society as a whole from physical harm to person or property."'
2004 WI 110, $ 25, 683 N.W.2d 46, 52 (quoting Daanen & Jassen, Inc. v. Cedarapids Inc., 573
N.W.2d 842, 846 (Wis. 1998)).
42. Van Lare, 2004 WI 110, 25, 683 N.W.2d at 52.
43. Daanen, 216 Wis. 2d at 403, 573 N.W.2d at 846.
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A. The Conception of the Role of Tort and Contract Law to Remedy
ContractBreaches Priorto Cease Electric
Wisconsin courts prior to Cease Electric refused to extend tort
liability to wrongs committed within the confines of a contract and
adopted the economic loss doctrine. That is, these cases rejected
attempts to turn duties imposed by mutual consent by virtue of a
contractual relationship into duties imposed by social policy in tort law.
Put yet another way, the doctrine was thought of traditionally as a
limitation on who may sue in tort for personal injury damages or
damage to property outside the contractual relationship. This view
made tort claims, in the context of a contract, the exception.
This conception of the respective roles of tort and contract law
reflected in the economic loss doctrine arose first in product liability
cases. The doctrine developed because courts viewed warranty law and
the law of contracts as better suited to deal with product defect cases.
One of the first applications appeared in the California case of Seely v.
White Motor Co." Eventually, the United States Supreme Court
approved the economic loss doctrine in East River Steam Ship Corp. v.
TransamericaDelaval" That case held that a claim for purely economic
losses arising out of a product's failure to perform up to the purchaser's
expectations should be a contract case, rather than a tort case. 6
The court wrote the following in East River: "Contract law, and the
law of warranty in particular, is well suited to commercial
controversies.., because the parties may set the terms of their own
agreements., 47 Wisconsin adopted the economic loss doctrine in
Sunnyslope Grading, Inc. v. Miller, Bradford & Risberg, Inc.4
Importantly, all three of these leading cases involved an alleged
defective product. Seely was a warranty case that involved defective

44. 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965). The first case to apply the economic loss doctrine was
Santor v. A&M Karagheusian,207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965), which predated Seely by only a few
months. See Steven C. Tourek & Thomas H. Boyd, Bucking the "Trend": The Uniform
Commercial Code, The Economic Loss Doctrine and Common Law Causes of Action for
Fraudand Misrepresentation,84 IOWA L. REv. 875, 885-91 (1999) (providing a history of the
economic loss doctrine). In Santor, the New Jersey Supreme Court held the warranty
provisions of the U.C.C. were not the exclusive remedies available to commercial purchasers.
207 A.2d at 311.
45. 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
46. Id. at 872-73.
47. Id.
48. 437 N.W.2d 213 (Wis. 1989).
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truck brakes that failed and caused a rollover accident;4 9 in East River,
the product was a defective turbine in a super-tanker; 0 in Sunnyslope
Grading, the case involved alleged defects in a piece of construction
equipment. Subsequent cases applied the economic loss doctrine to
cement,5 ' fireproofing material,52 and the component parts of a rock
crusher53 . Important here is that all of these cases involved contracts
between a commercial buyer and seller. 14
The court expanded application of the doctrine to consumer
purchasers in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Ford

Motor Co.55 In that case, the court held that a consumer who purchased
a truck in "as is" condition could not sue in tort after a fire caused by a
faulty ignition switch destroyed the entire vehicle. 6 Ironically, Ford
Motor Company issued a recall notice for a faulty ignition switch on the
plaintiff's Ford Bronco, which the company believed could start a fire,
about two months after the fire at issue in the case.57 The fire, however,
The court
occurred after the owner's extended warranty expired.
dismissed the case and held that warranty law applied, rather than tort
49. Seely, 403 P.2d at 147.
50. E. River, 476 U.S. at 861.
51. See Wausau Tile, Inc. v. County Concrete Corp., 593 N.W.2d 445 (Wis. 1999).
52. See Northridge Co. v. W.R. Grace, 471 N.W.2d 179 (Wis. 1991).
53. See Daanen & Jassen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 842 (Wis. 1998).
54. Following East River, federal courts expanded the economic loss doctrine to apply
"to contracts for professional services rendered in connection with [the] manufacture or
construction of the product by a party other than the builder or manufacturer." See, e.g.,
Nathaniel Shipping, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 920 F.2d 1256, 1265 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing
Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Suwanee River Spa Lines, Inc., 866 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1989)).
This application of the economic loss doctrine is also the majority rule under state law. For
example, in Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. SEC Donohue, Inc., 679 N.E.2d 1197,1201 (111. 1997),
a case considered but rejected by the court in Cease Electric, the Illinois Supreme Court held
that the economic loss doctrine applied to services when the "ultimate result" of the services
in question was a tangible object, such as an improvement to real estate. See also Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co. v. Childs, 52 F. Supp. 2d 139, 144 (D. Me. 1999) (the majority rule is that the
economic loss doctrine applies to construction-related services); Cathco, Inc. v. Valentiner
Crane Brunjes Onyon Architects, 944 P.2d 365, 368 (Utah 1997) (economic loss doctrine
applies to claims against architects); Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Delta Star, Inc., 206 A.D.2d 177,
181 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) ("The economic loss rule does not provide any basis for
distinguishing between the liability of product manufacturers and product installers for
damages relating to the expectations of contracting parties."); Flintkote Co. v. Dravo Corp.,
678 F.2d 942, 950 (11th Cir. 1982) (applying Georgia law and holding that the economic loss
doctrine applies to services "where the exercise of professional skills occurred only in the
process of manufacturing or constructing a product").
55. 592 N.W.2d 201 (Wis. 1999).
56. Id. at 203-04, 213-14.
57. Id. at 204.
58. Id.
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law. 9 Although the case expanded the economic loss doctrine to apply
to consumers as well as commercial purchasers, State Farm is still a case
that involved only a defective product.
In a number of decisions released since 2001, however, the court
applied the economic loss doctrine to contracts involving things other
than products. The implication of those cases is that the distinction
between a contract for products and services is not dispositive. For
example, the court applied economic loss doctrine precedent in the
employment contract case of Mackenzie v. Miller Brewing Co.' In that
case, Jerald Mackenzie sued his former employer, Miller Brewing
Company, for intentional misrepresentation and wrongful termination,
both tort claims.6' Mackenzie alleged Miller Brewing Company lied to
him when his supervisor told Mackenzie that his position would not be
affected by a corporate reorganization. 62 After having been misled,
Mackenzie alleged, he was later turned down for a more lucrative
position in a new department again based on a misrepresentation by his
supervisor. 63
The jury found in Mackenzie's favor and awarded approximately
$26.5 million.64 The court of appeals reversed.6 ' The Wisconsin
Supreme Court affirmed the reversal and held that employment is, in
essence, a contractual relationship and that the employee was precluded
from suing in tort. 66 According to the court, employees may sue for
breach of the employment contract, violation of a duty beyond the
terms of the employment contract, or promissory estoppel. 6 The court
declined to create a new tort for intentional misrepresentation to induce
continued employment. 6'
Two years later in Digicorp,Inc. v. Ameritech Corp.,' the Wisconsin
Supreme Court applied the economic loss doctrine in a contract case
that involved the sale of Ameritech calling services and calling plans.
There, Digicorp entered into a contract with Ameritech to become an
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 218-19.
2001 WI 23,
27-28, 623 N.W.2d 739, 749.
Id. T 1, 623 N.W.2d at 740.
Id. 3, 623 N.W.2d at 740
Id. 6, 623 N.W.2d at 741.
Id. 7,623 N.W.2d at 741.
Mackenzie v. Miller Brewing Co., 2000 WI App 48, 608 N.W.2d 331.
Mackenzie, 2001 WI 23, 27, 623 N.W.2d at 749.
Id. $ 23-25, 623 N.W.2d at 748.
Id. T 22, 623 N.W.2d at 747-48.
2003 WI 54, 662 N.W.2d 652.
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authorized Ameritech distributor and sell Ameritech's "Value-Link"
calling plan through Bacher Communications, a third-party sales
agency. 0 Ameritech's policy was that it must approve all employees
who sell its services, including third party agents.7 ' Digicorp sued
Ameritech after a Bacher employee forged signatures on more than 250
Value-Link applications;" Ameritech knew the Bacher employee was a
problem because he had been fired previously by another Ameritech
distributor for the same reason. 7' Digicorp "alleged breach of contract,
intentional misrepresentation,
strict liability misrepresentation,
negligent misrepresentation, and negligence" because Ameritech failed
to disclose the prior forgeries by the Bacher employee.
Ameritech
filed a third party complaint against Bacher, who in turn sued
Ameritech for various tort and contract claims, but not for punitive
damages.75
The trial court in Digicorp refused to dismiss Digicorp's or Bacher's
tort claims.7 1 Instead, the court applied a fraud-in-the-inducement
exception to the economic loss doctrine and sent all the tort claims
against Ameritech to the jury. 77 The jury returned a verdict, for the
most part, in Digicorp's favor and awarded it $13,080 for breach of
contract, $254,926 for misrepresentation, and $139,051 in punitive
damages; it awarded Bacher $100,000.78 The court of appeals affirmed
the portions of the verdict in Digicorp's favor. In doing so, it also
affirmed the verdict in favor of Bacher, again applying a fraud in the
inducement exception to the economic loss doctrine, even though
Bacher and Ameritech had no contract between them.79 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court affirmed and held the economic loss doctrine applied
but that Wisconsin recognized a narrow fraud in the inducement
exception.'
70. Id. 6, 662 N.W.2d at 654-55.
71. Id. 7, 662 N.W.2d at 655.
72. Id. TT 9-12, 662 N.W.2d at 656.
73. Id. 6, 662 N.W.2d at 655.
74. Id. 12, 662 N.W.2d at 656.
75. Id.
76. Id. 15,662 N.W.2d at 656.
77. Id.
78. Id. 16, 662 N.W.2d at 657.
79. Id. $ 18, 662 N.W.2d at 657.
80. Id. T 21, 662 N.W.2d at 657. The court restated the definition of the economic loss
doctrine as follows: "[A] commercial purchaser of a product cannot recover solely economic
losses from the manufacturer under negligence or strict liability theories, particularly, as here,
where the warranty given by the manufacturer specifically precludes the recovery of such
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Later, in Van Lare v. Vogt, the court held that the economic loss
doctrine applied to contracts to buy and sell real estate."' In Van Lare,

the plaintiff was a purchaser of real property who asserted a strict
liability claim for the previous owner's alleged failure to disclose that

the property had been used as an unlicensed disposal site for
construction waste. 2 The buyer, Van Lare, knew that the property had
some refuse dumping on it, had the chance to test for further dumping
and, despite those warning signs, opted to purchase the property "as
is." 3 The Wisconsin Supreme Court held the economic loss doctrine
applied.'
The defendant in Van Lare argued the economic loss doctrine
applied only to products. The court's response, however, was the

following: "[W]e conclude that the economic loss doctrine may not be
discarded simply because a transaction involves real estate. 85 The court
noted that its prior decisions defined the economic loss doctrine both
narrowly and broadly. 6 Specifically, the court restated the definition of
the doctrine from Digicorp and then set out a broader definition first
announced in Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc.:87 "a judiciallycreated remedies principle that operates generally to preclude

contracting parties from pursuing tort recovery for purely economic or
commercial losses associated with the contractual relationship."' 8 The
Van Lare court then rendered its decision based on the facts that

surrounded the transaction; it wrote, "In this case, we have a written,
bargained-for contract for the sale of commercial-use land between two
sophisticated parties represented by counsel during the negotiation
process." 9 Thus, finding all the hallmarks of a contract freely entered

into, the court held the case was "tailor made" for contract law. 90
damages." Id. 33, 662 N.W.2d at 659 (quoting Sunnyslope Grading, Inc. v. Miller, Bradford
& Risberg, Inc., 437 N.W.2d 213, 217-18 (Wis. 1989)).
81. 2004 WI 110, 2, 683 N.W.2d 46, 48.
82. Id. 4-11, 683 N.W.2d at 49-51.
83. Id.
4-6, 683 N.W.2d at 49.
84. Id. 41, 683 N.W.2d at 56.
85. Id. 21, 683 N.W.2d at 52.
86. Id. $ 19, 683 N.W.2d at 51.
87. 2004 WI 26, 677 N.W.2d 233.
88. Van Lare, 2004 WI 110, 19, 683 N.W.2d at 52 (quoting Tietsworth, 2004 WI 26,
23, 677 N.W.2d at 241).
89. Id. 21, 683 N.W.2d at 51-52.
90. Id. Note the contrast in application of the doctrine and the end-results: the court
applied the broad definition to preclude recovery in Tietsworth and Van Lare, but applied the
narrow definition to allow recovery in Cease Electric with only a passing reference to the
broader definition and no recognition of the difference.
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B. The Court's Conflicting Conception of Tort and ContractLaw in
Cease Electric
The holding in Cease Electric is built upon an entirely different
premise: that tort law-the law regulating duties imposed by social
policy, not the bargained for expectations of parties to a transaction-is
best suited to remedy wrongs committed within the confines of a
contract for services. Thus, according to the court in Cease Electric, if
the contract is one for services, there is no longer any need to maintain
the distinction between tort and contract law, no need to protect the
freedom to allocate risk, and no need to encourage the party best
situated to assess the risk of loss to assume, allocate or insure against the
risk.
This new conception of tort law in contract cases has pivotal
significance because it challenges the fundamental principles of the role
of tort in contract law that previously applied to all contracts. Before
Cease Electric, the economic loss doctrine was a tool to help courts
determine appropriate cases to over-lay tort law on the law of private
contracts; the rule was that tort law would apply only in exceptional
cases, such as personal injury cases, damage to other property, or the
sale of hazardous materials.9 ' The underlying problem with Cease
Electric's new conception of the role of tort law in enforcing contracts is
that the court established the opposite presumption for service
contracts, but provided no rational, fact-based explanation for such a
radical departure from the common law of contracts. In fact, the court
apparently failed to take note of the facts in Cease Electric that
91. To illustrate, if a party entered into a contract to purchase a product but the product

failed, yet did no damage to other property nor injured the product's owner, the owner could
sue under the contract, but not in tort. As a result, the reason for the product's failurewhether it was a known defect, negligent manufacturing or simply a mistake-was irrelevant.
The owner, whose expectations were not met, could recover his or her economic losses unless
provided for otherwise by the contract. But, if a product failed, and in doing so, caused a
personal injury to the owner, such as those sustained in an auto accident caused by defective
brakes, or causes damage to other property, for example, an engine that destroys other
equipment on a ship, the owner would have a claim in tort law for these injuries. Therein lies
the basis for the "other property" and "personal injury" exceptions to the economic loss
doctrine created as matter of social policy and specifically crafted not to eviscerate the
distinction between tort and contract law. Indeed, such exceptions preserve the distinction,
provided the economic loss doctrine is otherwise applied uniformly when a contract exists.
As a matter of policy, therefore, contracts are to be enforced, and tort claims arise only when
parties to a contract violate duties beyond the contract that cause extra-contractual injuries or
damage.
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undermine its presumptions and cast a long and skeptical shadow over
the value of the court's reasoning.
For example, the Cease Electric court concluded that a fundamental
premise of contract law-that parties will allocate risks and remediesis not present in many contracts for services; thus, there is no need to
maintain the distinction between tort and contract law.' The court,
however, failed to cite any authority for that sweeping conclusion. The
court claimed that the "facts demonstrated in this case" show that
parties typically do not allocate risk in service contracts.93 The court
further presumed, again without citing facts or precedent, that there
were "informational disparities between parties" to many service
contracts and, thus, unequal bargaining power." The court, however,
ignored the undisputed facts that belie the fallacy of its premise.
First, the egg farmer, Cold Spring, insured against losses caused by
the failure of its ventilation system.9" Indeed, Cold Spring's insurer was
the lead plaintiff.96 The egg farmer and its insurer, not the electrician,
had accurately calculated the value of the potential loss, should the
ventilation system fail and the chickens die, based on information in
Cold Spring' sole possession. That information was far beyond the
scope of any information readily available to the electrician. The egg
farmer, not the electrician, was thus in the best position to assess the
risk thereby demonstrating the absence of "informational disparities."
The facts of Cease Electric also demonstrate that no such
informational disparities existed with respect to remedies. The contract
in Cease Electric was between relatively sophisticated commercial
parties and, if anything, the electrician, not the egg farmer, was at a
After all, Cold Spring terminated the
bargaining disadvantage.
relationship when Cease Electric failed to meet its expectations. 97
Further, as a general matter, electricians are relatively easy to find,98 and
92. Cease Elec., 2004 WI 139, $1 42-43, 688 N.W.2d at 470.

93. Id.
94. Id.

42, 688 N.W.2d at 470.
46, 688 N.W.2d a 471.

95. Id. 1 10, 688 N.W.2d at 465.

96. Id.
97. Id. T 7, 688 N.W.2d at 465.
98. Wisconsin lists a total of 390 businesses and individuals licensed as electricians with

credentials approved by the state (which means the entity providing the services of an
electrician must be or employ a state licensed master-electrician). See WISCONSIN DEPT. OF
COMMERCE, SAFETY AND BUILDINGS DIVISION, LICENSES/CREDENTIALS, LIST OF
PREREQUISITES FOR OBTAINING CREDENTIALS, http://commerce.wi.gov/SB/Sbcredentialpr-

ogramsprerequisites.html (last visited October 12, 2005). Further, according to Wisconsin
Manufacturers and Commerce, there are 161 Wisconsin firms in its membership engaged in
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if some electricians charge too much or propose objectionable terms,
egg farmers may take their business elsewhere (which is precisely what
Cold Spring did).
The court compounded the problem by adopting the premise that
contract law was not as useful when applied to service contracts because
many are informal, oral contracts. 99 According to the court, "few parties
actually address the allocation of risk or the limitation of remedies"
°
when entering into "informal" contracts.'O
What the court failed to
acknowledge is that the decision not to formally allocate risk is, in and
of itself, an allocation decision. That is, Cold Spring had no reason to
allocate risk to Cease Electric, and thereby delay the start of work or
increase the cost of installation, because Cold Spring had insurance. In
a sense, it allocated the risk of loss to itself. The court's holding,
therefore, imposed on the parties contract terms that the court
conceded the parties did not agree upon-that Cease Electric would
bear the risk of loss despite Cold Spring's insurance.
In the end, the court's decision seems motivated by one concern
only-that applying the economic loss doctrine to service contracts
would provide lawyers, accountants, and other professionals with a
shield to ward off professional liability lawsuits."' Cease Electric,
however, was by no means a professional negligence case. Claims that
arise from a breach of a duty imposed independently of a contract, such
as a fiduciary duty, are an altogether different situation 10210Lawyers,
doctors"° and accountants ' 5 owe duties to clients, patients and third
parties that other service providers do not. In those cases, the alleged
tortfeasor may not use contract law to shield a tort liability for the
breach of the duty.

providing electricians' services. See

WISCONSIN BUSINESS SERVICES DIRECTORY, 458, SIC
1731-Electrical Work (2004).
99. Cease Elec., 2004 WI 139,
43-44, 688 N.W.2d at 470-71.
100. Id. 44, 688 N.W.2d at 471.
101. Id. TT 49-50, 688 N.W.2d at 471.
102. See, e.g., Bohler-Uddeholm Am., Inc. v. Ellwood Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 79 (3d Cir.
2001) (applying Pennsylvania law); U. Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf Ltd., 210 F.3d 1207 (10th
Cir. 2000) (applying Colorado law).
103. See Wis. SUP. Cr. R. 20:1.1-20:8.5 (West 2005).
104. See WIS. ADMIN. CODE § Med. 10 (2002).
105. See WIS. ADMIN. CODE § Accy. 1.203 (2004) (Accounting principles). That Code
section provides, in part: "No [accountant] shall express an opinion that financial statements
are presented in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles if such statements
contain any departure from [GAAP]." See also Chevron Chem. Co. v. Deloitte & Touche,
483 N.W.2d 314 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (resolving a claim by creditors against outside auditors).
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C. The Results in Cease Electric Demonstrate the Need to Restore
Efficiency
Once contractual relationships exist, contract law is more efficient
than tort law to remedy disappointed expectations. The underlying
objectives of tort law are to compensate the injured and deter future
tortious conduct. Tort law, as an overall system of incentives and
deterrence, may efficiently guide individuals to act reasonably or
otherwise within the confines of some social norm. Once two parties
begin a relationship, even an informal one, however, the justification for
applying tort law begins to disappear.
Parties to a contract are no longer in an accidental relationship that
may arise by happenstance, such as a car accident. The terms of the
relationship that the parties decide for themselves, rather than the rules
of tort law imposed by societal consensus, dictate how the parties
interact. This fact creates efficiencies because the generalities of tort
law are not specific enough to deal with each individual relationship.
Once a relationship develops, any number of things are possible; the
parties may negotiate a comprehensive contract or may enter into a
contract covered by the U.C.C. or that incorporates U.C.C. type
remedies. On the other hand, the parties may decide an informal
contract meets their needs. In the event of a breach, without regard to
the formality of the contract, contract law is sufficient to compensate the
non-breaching party; tort law, on the other hand, allocates liability and
damages less efficiently because it ignores the terms of the parties'
voluntary interaction. The result in Cease Electric illustrates this
point."
The Insurance Company of North America, the plaintiff in Cease
Electric, was the only party to the transaction that came out ahead. The
company wrote an insurance policy for the egg farm and, within the
policy, issued a specific endorsement for the ventilation system failure.
INA priced the policy based on the risk posed and then spread that risk
among its other policyholders to set premiums for all of its customers.
The premium INA set, presumably, contained a built-in profit margineven if INA paid losses on some of its policies. But when it came time
to payout under Cold Spring's policy, INA paid Cold Spring for its
losses, less the policy deductible, and then recovered the full amount it
paid to its policyholder from Cease Electric. In the meantime, INA got
106. See Milwaukee Art Auction Galleries Ltd. v. Chalk, 13 F.3d 1107, 1111 (7th Cir.
1994); see also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.19, at 99-101 (2d ed. 1990).
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to keep the premiums Cold Spring paid (with the built-in profit margin).
The egg farm, theoretically, came out even. Its own insurance
company paid its losses, and Cease Electric reimbursed it for the policy
deductible. 17 Cease Electric, on the other hand, is likely much worse off
in the long run. That is, it may have insurance coverage for the losses
sustained in this case, but to the extent its insurance coverage failed to
consider the risk of loss of the nature imposed by the court, Cease
Electric will bear the cost of that loss over time in the form of higher
premiums. In the end, the allocation of recovery in this case by the
court was entirely inefficient. Eschewing predictable contract law,
therefore, in favor of less predictable tort remedies, the court created
the very inefficiencies the contracting parties tried to avoid.
If tort claims for negligent contract performance proliferate, judges
and juries will be called upon regularly to determine whether a
particular contract or contract non-performance violated a social
standard rather than the terms of the contract. The cost of doing
business by contract, and accordingly the cost of services, will increase
to reflect the parties' perceptions of a judge's or jury's satisfaction with
the contract, ex post, rather than the expectations of the parties, ex
ante.1 O Because costs and the potential for liability create incentives, we
question whether the court evaluated fully the impact of its rule.
Perhaps the rule of Cease Electric creates incentives to enter into
contracts carefully to avoid tort liability; on the other hand, it also
creates escape hatches for buyers who do not pay attention to the terms
of contracts to which they agree.
Cease Electric also sets the stage for a potential parade of horribles
in contract cases. Punitive damages are not awardable in breach of
contract cases.' ° But, as a result of Cease Electric, companies that
provide services or participate in the chain of providers that render the
end-result services,11 are subject to both tort and contract claims for
providing services negligently. The result is a legal rule with yet more
consequences the court probably never contemplated. For example,
suppose the egg farmer in Cease Electric breached its contractual duty
107. Cease Elec., 2004 WI 139, 1 10, 688 N.W.2d at 465.
108. The court in Wausau Tile, Inc. v. County Concrete Corp., made the following
related point: "If tort recovery were permitted, sellers of products would be 'potentially liable
for unbargained-for and unexpected risks' ... leading eventually to higher prices for
consumers." 593 N.W.2d 445, 456 (Wis. 1999) (citation omitted) (quoting Daanen & Jassen,
Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 842, 849 (Wis. 1999)).
109. Entzminger v. Ford Motor Co., 177 N.W.2d 899, 903 (1970).
110. See Digicorp, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 2003 W154, 64, 662 N.W.2d 652, 666.
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to pay the electrician or supply the necessary parts. Could the
electrician recover in tort for the egg farmer's default? Under Cease
Electric, the answer is apparently "yes." After all, if society has an
interest in regulating the electrician's performance of a service contract,
it should have an equal interest in regulating the performance of the
other party to the same service contract. We find this to be an odd but
possible result."1
IV.

LINDEN V. CASCADE STONE COMPOUNDS THE PROBLEMS OF
CEASE ELECTRIC

The Court in Linden v. Cascade Stone adopted the "predominate

purpose" test, a grab bag of fact-dependent subjective and objective
factors, to hold that a contract with a general contractor to build a home
was predominately one for a product (a home), not for services (the
construction of a home). 112 In that case, the Lindens signed a written
contract with a general contractor, Groveland, to build a new home."1 3
Groveland retained various subcontractors to build the house. The
Lindens brought tort claims against both Groveland and two
subcontractors, alleging, among other things, that the subcontractors
negligently shingled the roof and applied stucco to the exterior walls. "4
The court held that, because the fixed-price contract between the
Lindens and Groveland was predominately for a product rather than
services, the economic loss doctrine barred the Lindens' tort claims
111. Cease Electric has implications for other cases that were correctly decided. For
example, Mackenzie v. Miller Brewing Co. held that an employee may sue his or her
employer for breach of contract if the employer failed to provide the employee with any
promised benefits of the employment relationship. 2001 WI 23, J 1, 623 N.W.2d 739, 740. At
a very basic level, the case stands for the proposition that if someone does not like his or her
job, the employee is free to change jobs; by not doing so, the person risks disappointment.
The remedy for disappointment, however, is recovery of money equivalent to the amount of
the unfulfilled contractual promise. Cease Electric could make one question whether
Mackenzie is still good law. After all, employees provide services, not products. If we follow
the rule of Cease Electricas stated, the economic loss doctrine does not apply. Id.
To be certain, Mackenzie is the flip-side of Cease Electric. That is, Gerald Mackenzie
sold his employment services to Miller Brewing but wanted tort remedies as the plaintiff. Id.
2, 623 N.W.2d at 740. Cease Electric sold its services to Cold Spring egg farm but
attempted to use the economic loss doctrine to shield it from tort liability. Cease Elec., 2004
WI 139, 9 12, 688 N.W.2d at 465. The rule of Cease Electric, however, does not draw such a
distinction. Gerald Mackenzie and Cease Electric provided services-not products-so their
cases should arguably be treated the same under the court's "bright-line" rule.
112. 2005 WI 113, 91
32,699 N.W.2d 189, 199-200.
113. Id. T12, 699 N.W.2d at 191.
114. Id. T 3, 699 N.W.2d at 191.
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against the subcontractors.115
The significant holding of Cascade Stone is that whether the
economic loss doctrine applies to a contract for both goods and services
turns on a court's application of a "predominant purpose" test-a mix
of subjective and objective factors that includes "the language of the
contract, the nature of the business of the supplier, the intrinsic worth of
the materials,... the circumstances of the parties, and the primary
objective they hoped to achieve by entering into the contract.' 1 6 The
court stated that this was a "totality of the circumstances" test."7 In this
instance, however, the court gave particular weight to its observation
that "the parties bargained for costs based on the specifications of the
house, not the amount of work put into completion of the project" to
conclude that the contract was for a product, not services."' Thus,
because the court concluded that the contract was predominately one
for a product, not for services, the economic loss doctrine applied.
Indeed, the court noted that the Lindens had bargained for coverage of
the risk of faulty workmanship with Groveland, and "[a]llowing the
Lindens to maintain a tort claim against the subcontractors for services
rendered to the general contractor would undermine the distinction
between contract law and tort law that the economic loss doctrine seeks
to preserve."' 9
Cascade Stone represents a significant expansion of Cease Electric
and magnifies the problems that arise when the issue turns, not on the
integrity of the contracting process, but rather on an analysis of whether
the contract was "predominantly" one for products or services. Under
Cascade Stone, the economic loss doctrine does not apply to contracts
for "services," nor does it apply to contracts for the sale of a product
when the mix of products and services is judged (by a court) to be

115. Id. 1 25, 699 N.W.2d at 197. Groveland settled with the Lindens. The court noted,
however, that allowing the Lindens to maintain tort claims against the subcontractors would
also allow them to circumvent their contract with Groveland, see id. 17, 699 N.W.2d at 195,
but its reasoning on that point is irrelevant to its analysis of whether the economic loss
doctrine applied. Ironically, the rule of the case implies that Cease Electric, had it been a
sub-contractor, could have invoked the economic loss doctrine; but, because it acted alone, it
faced tort liability.
116. Id. 21, 699 N.W.2d at 196 (citations omitted).
117. Id. 22, 699 N.W.2d at 196.
118. Id. 25, 699 N.W.2d at 197. Of course, this is the contract viewed from the buyer's
perspective; any contractor would evaluate a fixed-price contract from exactly the opposite
view that the price is based on the material cost plus the labor costs needed to complete the
project plus a profit.
119. Id. 17, 699 N.W.2d at 195.
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"predominantly" a contract for services.12

Thus, under Cease Electric

and Cascade Stone, the economic loss doctrine is inapplicable if fifty-one
percent of a contract price is for services, even though forty-nine
percent of the price represents a sale of a product. That is, the decisions
in Cease Electric and Cascade Stone are nothing more than an invitation

for attorneys and courts to engage in a legal exercise of artificial line
drawing.
If the court stays this course, it will confuse further the marketplace
contracting process. The uncertainty arises because buyers and sellers
of goods and services have no way of knowing whether a court will
weigh and apply the subjective and objective factors as they do, and thus
have no way of knowing whether their contracts are predominately for
services or products. Stated otherwise, the parties have no way of
knowing whether a court will accept their bargained-for allocation of
risk.
Further, a long line of future "predominate purpose" cases, exclusive
to building services and products, is almost guaranteed because the
courts will have to give some guidance on what factors are due what
weight and what "tips" the scale from product to services in close cases.
In sum, the decisions in Cease Electric and Cascade Stone ensure that

future application of the economic loss doctrine will turn, not on the
integrity of the contracting process between the parties, but on the
arguments of lawyers and the judgments of courts on whether a
particular fact pattern amounts to a contract for "services" or one for a
"product." A better rule would be to focus on the integrity of the
contracting process, and we explain why in the next section.
V. A BETTER RULE
A. The Rule Explained

We propose a better rule: when commercial parties enter into a
contract freely and voluntarily, such that the contracting process has
integrity and the policy implications of tort law do not arise, the parties
are limited to their bargain and may not sue in tort for remedies beyond
the contract. The issue in any case in which the parties perform under a
contract should be the integrity of the contracting process, not a court's
post-performance characterization of the contract nor its use of multi120. See id. $ 8, 699 N.W.2d at 193.
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factor tests that had no meaning to contracting parties when the
agreement was made. In this light, it should be clear that the rationale
of Cease Electric, premised upon a perceived distinction between the
application of contract law to service and product contracts, will prove
only problematic in future cases because distinctions between service
contracts and those for products, or judge-made rules to draw such
distinctions, are neither as clear nor as meaningful as the court assumed.
This proposed rule of law requires two things: a contract and a
bargaining process with integrity that demonstrates that the parties
freely and voluntarily entered into the contract. When these two
elements are present, the law should presume that the parties, rational
as they are, agreed to contract terms that, on balance, are what they
wanted and are sufficient to protect their respective interests. It also
reverses the presumptions Cease Electric and Cascade Stone created that
contract law is ill suited to enforce contracts that call for mostly services.
The rule would not apply, however, in the absence of a contract, or if
there was fraud or intentional misrepresentation or some other problem
with the formation that induced the other party to enter into the
contract or agree to a particular term. That is not to say that fraud as to
any term, for example, voids or renders the contract unenforceable; the
economic loss doctrine would simply not apply if one party, by fraud,
induced another to agree to a term that was in dispute in the lawsuit at
issue. The rule would also allow tort claims for personal injuries or
breaches of other duties, such as the fiduciary duty directors and officers
owe a corporation and its shareholders.
The rule we propose here has already been endorsed by one United
States district court that twice held, absent injury to persons or damage
to other property, the economic loss doctrine applies to contracts for
services entered into by sophisticated commercial parties.12 ' It is also
consistent with the premise underlying "freedom of contract" that
courts should protect the expectancy interests of parties to a contract
when there is "a bargain freely and voluntarily made through a process
of bargaining which has integrity."'22 At least in the context of contracts
between commercial parties, the rule further dispenses with artificial
distinctions, such as those between contracts for "services" and those for
"products," that merely create more cases over the scope of the
distinctions rather than add to the usefulness of the rule.
121. Stoughton Trailers, Inc. v. Henkel Corp., 965 F. Supp. 1227, 1235 (W.D. Wis. 1997);
Wausau Paper Mills Co. v. Chas. T. Main, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 968, 974 (W.D. Wis. 1992).
122. Merten v. Nathan, 321 N.W.2d 173, 178 (Wis. 1982).
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The proposed rule would not deprive a contracting party of
remedies to the extent the court implied in Cease Electric. Damages for
breach of contract and those that are the natural and probable
consequences of a breach are potentially recoverable in contract cases.13
But so are economic losses, such as repair and replacement costs 124 and
lost profits. 25 Further, the traditional exceptions for personal injury and
damage to other property would also apply, thereby ensuring traditional
tort claims would survive. 121
Nor would this rule require overturning years of Wisconsin
precedent. To the contrary, it is the same definition of the doctrine the
court announced in Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc. and Digicorp,
Inc. v. Ameritech Corp.; both cases described the economic loss doctrine
as follows: "A judicially-created remedies principle that operates
generally to preclude contracting parties from pursuing tort recovery for
purely economic or commercial losses associated with the contract
relationship.' 27 The court later applied this rule in Cascade Stone. The
rule announced in those cases required only a "contract relationship"
and made no distinction between service contracts and those for
products; it imposed no writing requirement; and it made no
123. Magestro v. N. Star Envtl. Constr., 2002 WI App 182, 1 10, 649 N.W.2d 722, 726
("Contract damages should compensate the wronged party for damages that arise naturally
from the breach ....); Kraemer v. Memominie Area Bd. of Educ., 2001 WI App 244, 635
N.W.2d 857 (consequential damages awardable in breach of employment contract case, but
limited by forseeability, mitigation and certainty).
124. Wausau Tile, Inc. v. County Concrete Corp., 593 N.W.2d 445, 451 (citing E. River
S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Deleval, 476 U.S. 858, 870 (1986); Miller v. U.S. Steel Corp., 902
F.2d 573, 574 (7th Cir. 1990); and Northridge v. W.R. Grace & Co., 471 N.W.2d 179, 184 (Wis.
1991)).
125. Wausau Tile, 593 N.W.2d at 451 (citing Daanen & Jassen v. Cedarapids, Inc., 573
N.W.2d 842, 845 (Wis. 1998); Northridge, 471 N.W.2d at 182; and Steven R. Swanson, The
Citadel Survives A Naval Bombardment: A Policy Analysis of the Economic Loss Doctrine, 12
TUL. MAR. L.J. 135, 140 (1987)).
126. Also surviving adoption of our rule would be tort claims that arise from duties that
exist independently of the performance of a contract. Those claims include tort claims over
the delivery of professional services, (a concern of the court in Cease Electric; see supra notes
51-55 and accompanying text). Also alive and well would be tort claims for negligent
performance of a contract where a party has assumed duty beyond the terms of the contract.
See, e.g., Colton v. Foulkes, 47 N.W.2d 901 (Wis. 1951); but see Landwehr v. Citizens Trust
Co., 329 N.W.2d 411, 414 (Wis. 1983) (stating that "there must be a duty existing
independently of the performance of the contract for a cause of action in tort to exist") and
Greenburg v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 492 N.W.2d 147, 152 (Wis. 1992) ("In Landwehr, we
explained that our language in Colton was meant to indicate that the 'state of things" which
arises out of a contract to furnish the occasion for the tort, but not the underlying duty for the
tort."').
127. Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 2004 WI 32, 1 23, 677 N.W.2d 233, 241; see
Digicorp, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 2003 WI 54, IT 33-35, 662 N.W.2d 562, 569.
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prejudgments about whether contract or tort law offered a more
suitable remedy. 28
B. The PrinciplesBehind The Rule
1. Contracts are Necessary for Efficient Economic Exchanges
The buying and selling of goods and services, the creation of markets
to facilitate transactions and institutions to regulate them, the
organization of firms, and even money, are all common-place economic
phenomena that exist to address some of the fundamental issues
confronting society, such as how to accumulate, invest, or distribute
wealth. Put otherwise,
economics is mankind's pursuit of "the ordinary
29
life."'
of
business
The rule we propose is built upon the bedrock principle that "[t]he
law of contracts is based on the principle of freedom of contract, on the
principle that individuals should have the power to govern their own
affairs without governmental interference.""'3
Thus, "[t]he courts
protect each party to a contract by ensuring that the promises will be
performed ... [because] [t]he law protects justifiable expectations and

the security of transactions."' '3'
As Judge Posner put it, "the
fundamental function of contract law (and recognized as such at least
since Hobbes's day) is to deter people from behaving opportunistically
toward their contracting parties, in order to encourage the optimal
timing of economic activity and (the same point) obviate costly selfprotective measures.' ' 2 Contracts thus facilitate and indeed are
necessary to day-to-day economic activity.
2. For the Rule to Apply, There Must be a Contract
We agree, in part, with Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent in Grams

v. Milk Products, Inc.'33 One of the reasons for her dissent in that case
128. See Tietsworth, 2004 WI 32,
33-35, 662 N.W.2d at 569.

23, 677 N.W.2d at 241; Digicorp, Inc., 2003 WI 54,

1$

129. ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 1 (8th ed. 1890).

130. Merten v. Nathan, 321 N.W.2d 173, 177 (Wis. 1982).
131. Id.
132. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 103 (5th ed. 1998) (footnote

omitted).
133. 2005 WI 112,699 N.W.2d 167.
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was that the plaintiffs had no contractual relationship with the
defendant and, thus, in her opinion, the economic loss doctrine should
not have applied. 34 The existence of a contract and the opportunity to
bargain to protect one's interest is, of course, central to the principles
behind applying the economic loss doctrine.
In Milk Products, the purchasers of a product called "Half-Time"
sued the product manufacturer and distributor for breach of warranty,
negligence, and other torts.
Their suit claimed the product, a
nutritional supplement or milk replacer for livestock, damaged their
calves' immune system and increased mortality rates among the herd.136
The Grams had a contractual relationship with the distributor, but they
had no contact with Milk Products Inc., the manufacturer, until a
problem arose. 37 The court, nevertheless, held that the economic loss
doctrine applied to bar the plaintiff's tort claims because the claimed
damages were "the result of disappointed expectations of a bargainedfor product's performance." '38
That is not to say that Milk Products was wrongly decided; it is,
perhaps, ambiguous in its wording. The court referred repeatedly to the
Grams' "disappointed expectations," but it also wrote that their only
claim was against Cargil, the distributor. 39 They may, however, have a
claim under section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 4 '
against Milk Products.141
That claim would fit squarely within the
economic loss doctrine because it is based in contract, not in tort.
Such a claim also specifically provides for expectation damages that may
or may not be different than those available in a pure breach of contract

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id.

63, 699 N.W.2d at 182.
9, 699 N.W.2d at 170.
Id. J 8, 699 N.W.2d at 170.
Id. 10, 699 N.W.2d at 170.
Id. 3, 699 N.W.2d at 169.
Id. $ 55, 699 N.W.2d at 180.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1981):
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action
or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which
does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for
breach may be limited as justice requires.

Id.
141. See Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
142. See Hoffman, 133 N.W.2d 267. The majority opinion in Milk Products, however,
made no mention of Hoffman or of section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
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claim.1

There is, however, a clear distinction in our minds between cases
such as Milk Products,which involved an ingredient in a mass produced
and widely distributed product, and those that involve a direct
contractual relationship for a specified product, such as the home in
Cascade Stone, or a defined service, such as the ventilation system
installation in Cease Electric. For example, Cascade Stone involved a
homeowner's claim against its subcontractors; although there was no
contract between the homeowner and the subcontractors, there was a
definitive general contract between the homeowner and the builder.1"
In that type of case, as was also the case in Digicorp, Inc. v. Ameritech
Corp., both parties to the contract expected that the general contractor
would hire subcontractors to perform some or all of the work. If a roof
is installed negligently, or some other part of the home fails to meet
expectations established by the contract, the general contractor may be,
and is generally prepared to be, held liable. We would, therefore, draw
a clear distinction between subcontractor cases, such as Cascade Stone
and product cases, such as Milk Products.
3. Courts Should Protect the Integrity of the Contracting Process
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has long held that it will enforce a
contract that is the result of "a bargain freely and voluntarily made
through a process of bargaining which has integrity., 145 There would
seem to be nearly limitless scenarios in which contracts are freely and
voluntarily made through a bargaining process that has integrity; courts
make exceptions to contract enforcement, typically in consumer
transactions, where there is unequal bargaining power, where the
contract is induced by fraud, where the contract lacks consideration,
where the product is a necessity or no alternative source of the product
is readily available, or where the purchaser cannot reasonably insure
against consequential damages. 146 Application of this "freely and
voluntarily made" contract standard and its exceptions should be no
different when the contract is between commercial parties and without
regard to whether the subject matter of the contract is a service or
143.
144.
145.
146.
1999).

Milwaukee Auction Galleries Ltd. v. Chalk, 13 F.3d 1107, 1111 (7th Cir. 1994).
Linden v. Cascade Stone, 2005 WI 113,
2-3,699 N.W.2d 189, 191.
Merten v. Nathan, 321 N.W.2d 173, 178 (Wis. 1982).
See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 592 N.W.2d 201, 218 (Wis.
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product. Likewise, exceptions to application of the economic loss
doctrine should be uniform as well.
Nothing in the principles behind applying the economic loss doctrine
to contracts for services or products alters the rules that apply to
ensuring integrity in the process of forming a contract. A court's
primary objective, therefore, should be to enforce a party's reasonable,
bargained for contract expectations.14 Courts should decline to enforce
'
a contract only if it "violates a statute, rule of law, or public policy."148
This is where Cease Electric went wrong.
The court in Cease Electric assumed that contracts for services were
not the result of a free and voluntary process because so-called
"informational disparities" existed that resulted in unequal bargaining
power.'4 9 But this is tantamount to finding that there is a problem with
the formation of every contract for services and that some type of
exigent circumstances require court intervention and policing of the
contracting process. There is no basis to apply such a presumptionand the court cited none-to contracts between commercial entities.
"Sophisticated parties are just as capable of allocating the risk of
150
economic loss in a contract for services as in a contract for a product.'
Court-imposed risk allocations based on social policy and the court's
perception of unequal bargaining power between commercial entities
will succeed only in imposing additional transaction costs on commercial
parties. As long as the decision to contract is made freely, without force
or deception material to the decision at hand, then courts should
enforce commercial parties' agreements and expectations and apply the
economic loss doctrine to maintain the distinction between tort and
contract. To do any less, or any more as Cease Electric attempted to,
would create unequal bargaining power and informational disparities
where none existed previously.
Our view of the economic loss doctrine is entirely consistent with
precedent that pre-dates Cease Electric and narrow exceptions to the
pre-Cease Electric rule. For example, the court's key decision on the
fraud in the inducement exception to the economic loss doctrine was the
plurality opinion in Digicorp, Inc. Subsequent to Digicorp, Inc., the
court stressed that "the Digicorp majority clearly rejected a broad fraud

147. Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Wis. 1987).
148. See, e.g., Continental Cas. Co. v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 473 N.W.2d 584, 586
(Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
149. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec., Inc., 2004 WI 139, T 46, 688 N.W.2d 462, 471.
150. Stoughton Trailers, Inc. v. Henkel Corp., 965 F. Supp. 1227, 1233 (W.D. Wis. 1997).
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in the inducement exception to the economic loss doctrine.""'' Of the
majority of justices who rejected the broad fraud in the inducement rule
of Douglas-Hanson Co. v. BF Goodrich Co.,l12 Justice Sykes did not

recognize any fraud in the inducement exception; Justices Crooks and
Prosser recognized a narrow exception such as that adopted in Huron3
Tool and Engineering Co. v. Precision Consulting Services, Inc.1
Therefore, applying the "narrowest grounds" test 5 4 to the court's ruling,

Digicorp, Inc. stands for the proposition that, while there is a fraud in
the inducement exception to the economic loss doctrine, it is a narrow
exception. 5 Accordingly, the court adopted a narrow fraud
in the
15 6
Co.
Sales
Kellogg
v.
Inc.
Enterprises,
Kaloti
in
test
inducement
4. A Commercial Contract Must be Definite, but Need not be in
Writing to be Enforceable
Many commercial contracts are in writing, but as Cease Electric
demonstrates, it is also common for commercial parties to enter into
oral contracts. Cease Electric demonstrates that commercial parties
151. Van Lare v. Vogt, Inc., 2004 WI 110,
47, 683 N.W.2d 46, 57 (Crooks, J.,
concurring) (citing Digicorp, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 2003 WI 54, 3, 662 N.W.2d 652, 654).
152. 598 N.W.2d 262 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). A particular point of a plurality opinion is
considered an opinion of the court when a majority of participating judges agree upon it.
State ex rel. Thompson v. Jackson, 546 N.W.2d 140, 142 (Wis. 1996) (citing State v. Elam, 538
N.W.2d 249, 250 (Wis. 1995)).
153. 532 N.W.2d 541 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995). Digicorp, Inc., 2003 WI 54, 5 n.2, 677
N.W.2d at 243 n.2; see also Van Lare , 2004 WI 110,
51, 683 N.W.2d at 49 (Crooks, J.,
concurring); Tietsworth v. Harley Davidson, Inc., 2004 WI 32, 9132, 677 N.W.2d 233, 243 ("A
majority of the justices participating.., overruled Douglas-Hanson Co. to the extent that it
recognized a broad exception to the economic loss doctrine for all claims of fraud-in-theinducement of a contract.").
154. When applying plurality decisions, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has adopted the
"narrowest grounds" approach of the United States Supreme Court. Vincent v. Voight, 2000
WI 93, 46 n.18, 614 N.W.2d 388, 405 n.18; Lounge Mgmt. v. Town of Trenton, 580 N.W.2d
156, 160 (Wis. 1998). Thus, in the plurality decision, "the holding of the Court may be viewed
as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest
grounds." Vincent, 2000 WI 93, 9146 n.18, 614 N.W.2d at 405 n.18 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). See also Marks v. United
States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
155. 2003 WI 54, 91
3, 662 N.W.2d at 654. The court in Digicorp,Inc., wrote: "Wisconsin
recognizes a narrow fraud in the inducement exception [and] recovery of the benefit of the
bargain is prohibited where the fraud in the inducement exception applies and tort remedies
are sought." Id. 9168, 662 N.W.2d at 667. This narrow exception and a forced election of
remedies is yet another example of precedent that acknowledges the importance of
distinguishing between tort and contract law.
156. 2005 WI 111, 699 N.W.2d 205.
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operate under certain assumptions: property owners have property
insurance; contractors warrant that their performance will be
undertaken in a reasonable, workmanlike manner; and if a product or
service is defective, the buyer should not have to pay.'57 The court in
Cease Electric departed from those assumptions. In doing so, it implied

there is something about oral contracts that is less enforceable than
written contracts. Another possible implication of the holding in Cease

Electric, therefore, is to impose a writing requirement on all commercial
service contracts in order to avoid tort liability.
Perhaps cases in which parties enter into comprehensive written
contracts for services that provide warranties, or spell out insurance
responsibilities and other terms of liability, are the "certain
circumstances" that the court was referring to in Cease Electric that
would trigger application of the economic loss doctrine.
In other
words, the rule of Cease Electric could be read to be limited to oral

contract cases, not contracts where "we have a written, bargained-for
contract for the sale of commercial ... [services] between two
sophisticated parties represented by counsel during the negotiation
process" as the court found in Van Lare.'59 Those cases have the
hallmarks of fairness that apparently motivated the court to decide Van
Lare for the defense; without such protections, the court decided Cease

Electric for the plaintiffs.
The court's citation to the Minnesota case of McCarthy Well Co. v.
St. Peter Creamery, Inc.,16° provides support for this reading of Cease
Electric. In McCarthy Well Co., the court held that well drilling services

did not arise out of a "commercial transaction" within the meaning of
U.C.C. Article 2 and, therefore, were not subject to the economic loss
doctrine. 161

Important to the court's analysis in McCarthy Well,

157. These assumptions run through a long history of common law in cases such as Wells
v. Calnan, 107 Mass. 514 (1871) and Thompson v. Gould, 37 Mass. 134 (1838). Those seminal
cases stand for the rule that owners in possession of real property bear the risk of loss; thus,
the obligation to carry insurance, falls on the party in possession. See Smith v. Hardware
Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 33 N.W.2d 206 (Wis. 1948).
158. Ins. Co. of N. Amer. v. Cease Elec., 2004 WI 139, 24, 688 N.W.2d 462, 467.
159. Van Lare v. Vogt, Inc., 2004 WI 110, 21,683 N.W.2d 46, 52.
160. 410 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. 1987).
161. In McCarthy Well Co., St. Peter Creamery alleged that McCarthy Well negligently
performed its contract to restore the creamery's artisan well. 410 N.W.2d at 315. McCarthy
Well performed a number of operations, including exploding dynamite at the bottom of the
well to increase the flow of water in the well. Id. After the well produced a water flow, the
pumps McCarthy Well installed began breaking. Id. Eventually, the creamery dug a new
well and installed a new pump. McCarthy Well billed the creamery $34,573 for well drilling
and $8329 for a pump. Id. McCarthy billed the creamery a second time for labor associated

[89:137

MARQUETTE LA W REVIEW
however,

were

the

written

terms

and

conditions

of

the

acknowledgement of order form. McCarthy Well claimed its terms and

conditions, on the back of its acknowledgement of order form,
contained a valid exculpatory clause that provided: "Contractor[s] shall
not be liable for... [a]ny other damage or liability of any nature
whatsoever arising or growing out of the Contractor's work
hereunder." '62 The court found the terms and conditions, including the

exculpatory clause, were unenforceable because they were on the
reverse side of the acknowledgement form and in font so small as to be
unreadable.1 63 The implication of this holding is that, had the terms and
conditions been clearly set forth, the court would have enforced
McCarthy Well's exculpatory clause. 6'
with pump repairs in the amount of $4369. The creamery made partial payment, and
McCarthy Well sued to recover the balance. The creamery asserted a counterclaim that
alleged McCarthy Well negligently performed drilling services and pump installation that
damaged the creamery's dried milk products. Id. McCarthy Well raised the economic loss
doctrine as a defense. The court ruled, however, that under Superwood Corp. v.
Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981), the economic loss doctrine applied only to
commercial transactions; a "commercial transaction" under the Superwood rule is a
transaction governed by Article 2 of the U.C.C., Minnesota Statutes, Chapter 336 (1986). Id.
Because drilling services and pump installations are not covered by Article 2, the court held
that the contract between the parties was not a commercial transaction and thus, that
McCarthy Well could not raise the economic loss doctrine as a defense. Id. at 315.
162. Id. at 315.
163. Specifically, the court wrote the following:
These terms, arranged in a two-column format, are, to say the least,
comprehensive and cover the entire page, leaving no room for
amendments. If a customer wished to negotiate, it would be difficult to
know where or how to begin. What is fatal, however, is that the terms are
printed on dark paper in tiny print (what appears to be about 3-point
type), with no highlighting of the various sections and subsections as to
their contents. The exculpatory section appears in the middle of this
impenetrable text. To read the terms and conditions with any degree of
comprehension is difficult, exceedingly tedious, and even physically
painful.
Id. at 315-16. The court went on to state specifically that "this is a case where a party is not
able to know what the contract terms are because they are unreadable." Id. at 316.
164. It is not at all clear that construction contractors in particular would be ever be able
to limit their liability by contract as a result of the holding in Cease Electric that allows a tort
claim for relief seeking economic damages from the negligent rendering of constructionrelated services. Section 859.49 of the Wisconsin Statutes reads as follows:
Any provision to limit or eliminate tort liability as a part of or in
connection with any contract, covenant or agreement relating to the
construction, alteration, repair or maintenance of a building, structure, or
other work related to construction, including any moving, demolition or
excavation, is against public policy and void.
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If the contract in McCarthy Well was definite, but not in writing,
should it have been enforced? We think yes, but the answer to that
question has little if anything to do with the economic loss doctrine or
maintaining the distinction between tort and contract law. It is an issue
of contract formation and, if the terms are clear, courts should enforce
Imposing the formality of an additional writing
the contract.
requirement as a condition of applying the economic loss doctrine to an
otherwise enforceable oral or implied contract would impose costs
where the commercial parties to the contract have already determined
that these costs need not be imposed, and the parties have already
allocated the risk through price. Subject to the statutory exceptions
long recognized for policy reasons,165 the parties are in the best position
to determine when a written contract is necessary.
5. Contracting Parties Need to Know Their Liabilities Up-Front
Contracting parties need to know their liabilities at the time a
contract is entered into in order to set prices. The uncertainty that now
plagues service contracts, and those that call for a mix of products and
services, demonstrates another problem with after-the-fact tests, such as
Cease Electric and the predominate purpose test. Sellers take into
account liabilities for things such as product defects, warranty work,
returns, refunds, and other off-sets to revenue; buyers consider quality,
warranties, delivery time, and countless other factors unique to each
situation. Price reflects those factors. Further, parties to contracts often
seek to limit their liability by contract; others attempt to allocate risk by
requiring one party or another to carry insurance. Price setting factors
WIS. STAT. § 895.49(1) (2003-04). Because it is limited to "tort liability," this statute prohibits
contracting parties from negotiating limitations of liability for breaches of warranty or other
types of breaches of contract. If there is "no tort claim to begin with" for purely economic
losses, the statute is irrelevant. See Wausau Paper Mills Co. v. Chas. T. Main, Inc., 789 F.
Supp. 968, 974 (W.D. Wis. 1992). The court in Cease Electric, however, recognized a tort
claim for negligent performance of a contract for services; thus, the statute might well be read
to preclude even sophisticated parties from agreeing to limit a construction contractor's
liability when contracting to provide services.
165. See Wis. STAT. § 241.02(1) (2004) ("Agreements, what must be written"). That
statute section is Wisconsin's statute of frauds that requires certain contracts be in writing,
such as an agreement not to be performed within one year, section 241.02(1)(a); promises to
answer for the debt of another, section 241.02(1)(b); and promises made upon consideration
of marriage, section 241.02(1)(c); but not to marital property agreements that otherwise
comply with Chapter 766. See Wis. STAT. § 241.02(2). This statute, and others that require a
writing, imply that the job of imposing a writing requirement on commercial service contracts
is for the legislature.
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and sellers' liability in the service contract context is now entirely
unclear as a result of Cease Electric; the prices of even more contracts
are called into question under Cascade Stone.
In Cease Electric, the parties had an oral contract for the installation
of a ventilation system. The system was a deliverable, much like a road,
a bridge or, as in Cascade Stone, a house. It could be inspected and

warranted. But how should a contractor price its services when its labor
is subject to tort claims (and the corresponding insurance to cover
them), but the products it installs may not be? This is an impracticable
confluence of risks, incentives, and penalties that will arise again and
again because every electrician needs conduit and switches; every mason
needs mortar; every repairman needs spare parts; every carpenter needs
a hammer and nails-so just about every service has some product that
comes with it. Even with the court's holding in Cascade Stone, the
in an
distinction between products and services blurs considerably
'66
increasingly technological and information-based economy.

6. Wisconsin Precedent is Sufficient to Fashion a Workable Set of Rules
At last check, there were thirteen Wisconsin Supreme Court cases
that applied or, in some significant way discussed, the economic loss
doctrine. 67 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rendered fifteen decisions
on the doctrine in the last two years alone.' 68 In addition, United States
166. The "predominate purpose" test of the U.C.C. cannot, however, help in the entire
spectrum of cases because the court has already expanded the economic loss doctrine well
beyond the confines of the U.C.C. in cases such as Mackenzie v. Miller Brewing Co., 2001 WI
23, 623 N.W.2d 739 (applying the economic loss doctrine to employment contracts); State
Farm v. Ford Motor Co., 592 N.W.2d 201 (Wis. 1999) (applying the doctrine to consumer
transactions); Digicorp, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 2003 WI 54, 662 N.W.2d 652 (involving long
distances services and calling plans); Van Late v. Vogt, 2004 WI 110, 683 N.W.2d 46 (applying
the doctrine to real estate transactions).
167. See Sunnyslope Grading, Inc. v. Miller, Bradford & Risberg, Inc., 437 N.W.2d 213
(Wis. 1989); Daanen & Jassen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, 573 N.W.2d 842 (Wis. 1998); Wausau Tile
Inc. v. County Concrete Corp., 593 N.W.2d 445; Northridge Co. v. W.R. Grace, 471 N.W.2d
179 (Wis. 1991); State Farm, 592 N.W.2d 201; Mackenzie, 2001 WI 23, 623 N.W.2d 739;
Digicorp, Inc., 2003 WI 54, 662 N.W.2d 652; Tietsworth v. Harley Davidson Co., 2004 WI 26,
677 N.W.2d 233; Van Lare, 2004 WI 110, 683 N.W.2d 46; Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec.,
2004 WI 139, 688 N.W.2d 462; Linden v. Cascade Stone, Co., 2005 WI 113, 699 N.W.2d 189;
Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 2005 WI 112, 699 N.W.2d 167; Kaloti Enters. v. Kellogg Sales, Co.,
2005 WI 111, 699 N.W.2d 205.
168. Chief Justice Abrahamson pointed out in Milk Products, Inc. that "[a]ccording to
one commentator, the economic loss doctrine has been an issue in the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals and Supreme Court 47 times during 2000-2004." Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 2005
WI 112, 1 57,699 N.W.2d 167, 180 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).
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District Courts and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit have issued multiple decisions on the economic loss doctrine that
applied Wisconsin law. This is sufficient precedent for Wisconsin to
fashion its own workable and consistent rules on when lower courts are
to apply tort law to contract cases.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in past cases relied on Illinois
Supreme Court precedent to frame the rules on how to apply the
economic loss doctrine. It cited Illinois law to decide whether the
hazardous materials exception169 would apply to the integrated systems
rule.17 ° On the issue of whether to apply the economic loss doctrine to
service contracts, however, it declined to follow Fireman's Fund
Insurance Co. v. SEC Donohue, Inc.'71 In that case, the Illinois Supreme
Court held that the economic loss doctrine applied to constructionrelated services when the "ultimate result" of the services in question
was a tangible object, such as an improvement to real property."' The
Wisconsin Supreme Court cited subsequent criticisms of Fireman'sFund
as the basis for not adopting its holding. 73
Instead, the court turned for the first time to Minnesota law and
applied McCarthy Well Co. v. St. Peter Creamery, Inc.' That case held
that the economic loss doctrine does not apply to service contracts
because they are not "commercial" transactions within the meaning of
Article 2 of the U.C.C. McCarthy Well Co. relied on Superwood Corp.
v. Siempelkamp Corp.'75 to reach its holding. 76 The Minnesota Supreme
Court, however, overturned Superwood for the most part in Hapka v.
77
It held that a property owner could not invoke the
Paquin Farms.'
"other property" exception to the economic loss doctrine to sue in tort
when the contract in question was between two commercial parties; the
7
That case drew a distinction, not
U.C.C. was the exclusive remedy."
recognized in Wisconsin, between consumer and commercial cases."'
169. Northridge Co., 471 N.W.2d at 184-86 nn.10, 12.
170. Wausau Tile, 593 N.W.2d at 453 (citing Trans States Airlines v. Pratt & Whittney
Can., Inc., 682 N.E.2d 45, 58 (I11.1997)).
171. 679 N.E.2d 1197 (I11.1997).
172. Id. at 1201.
173. Cease Elec., 2004 WI 139, 11 50-51, 688 N.W.2d at 472.
174. 410 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. 1987).
175. 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981).
176. McCarthy Well Co., 410 N.W.2d at 315.
177. 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990).
178. Id. at 688.
179. Id. ("[W]e continue to regard the Code remedies as something less than adequate
in the ordinary consumer transaction.").
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Our proposed rule, on the other hand, does not rely on the law of
any other state. It would, however, bring together the holdings in
Sunnyslope Grading, Daanen, and Van Lare and the methodology the
court used to apply the economic loss doctrine in Mackenzie, Digicorp,
and Tietsworth. There is only one way to coalesce those holdings and
their application: to reaffirm that, at least in the case of contracts
between commercial parties, contract law is better suited than tort law
to address breaches of contract without regard to whether the contract
is for products or services."'
VI. CONCLUSION

The court's decision in Cease Electric to allow tort remedies in a
contract case fails to encourage the efficient distribution of risk and
reverses time-tested presumptions about the role of tort law in contract
cases. By allowing a party to plead tort causes of action for a breach of
contract, Cease Electric has introduced the prospect of a party obtaining
both compensatory and punitive damages for a breach of contract. The
providers of services, therefore, must now insure not only against the
foreseeable risk of loss caused by their breach of a service agreement,
but also against any additional compensatory and punitive damages that
may stem from their actions under the rationale of Cease Electric. A
better legal rule, the rule we propose here, is one that enforces contracts
freely entered into after the opportunity to bargain through a
contracting process that has integrity. That rule coalesces all of the
court's previous holdings and establishes a certain and reliable rule of
law that promotes efficiency.

180. To reaffirm this principle, it is debatable whether the court would even need to
overrule Cease Electric. Arguably, the court could later clarify that the rule of Cease Electric
applies to oral contract where there is no evidence that the parties bargained or had the
opportunity to bargain over remedies. That clarification does not fit the facts of Cease
Electric precisely-the parties were two commercial entities with a long history of doing
business and most likely negotiated on an ongoing basis-but at least the record in the case
does not contradict such a clarification.

